In the good old times in which the economists of the preceding generation lived, and from which they drew their economic illustrations and ideas, [price] changes seldom occurred, and when they did take place were very limited in extent, and came so slowly into effect as to attract no attention. All common articles of consumption had fixed prices which often did not change for a lifetime, and if any dealer had attempted to charge more than custom demanded, it would have attracted the attention and aroused the indignation of the whole community. These conditions have been so altered that to-day a merchant must consult his paper each day before he can know where to purchase a stock at the best advantage. The consumer also must be on his guard or he will pay too much for his sugar or flour. Dress goods and clothing, even at retail, fluctuate so rapidly in value that a study of advertisements is essential to a careful purchaser. With a growing collection of microdata studies finding infrequent price changes, a next step is to ask whether price changes today are more frequent or less frequent in the present than in the past. 1 The answer to this question may help explain differences in economic performance across time. For example, if price movements reflect market forces then declining nominal price rigidity-the time between price changes-may lead to improved resource allocation and higher productivity, and may have important implications for business cycles and the transmission of monetary policy.
As is related in the opening quote, over one-hundred years ago Simon Patten suggested price changes were much more frequent by 1889 than they were "in the good old times".
Unfortunately, Patten did not include quantitative support for his assertion, and little timeseries data exists before 1889 to verify his claim. However, even at the end of Patten's period the long life of retail prices is anecdotally supported by Levy and Young's (2004) finding that the retail price of a 6.5 ounce Coke remained unchanged for the 73 years from 1886 to 1959.
More recent studies using data from the 1950s through the 1980s, such as Cecchetti (1986) (magazine prices), Carlton (1986) (wholesale industrial goods prices), and Kashyap (1995) (apparel and outdoor goods prices from catalogs), find a shorter time between price changes-on the order of one year. Even more recently, studies using retail price data from the 1990s suggest the time between price changes may have decreased to around a few months. 2 However, these studies differ so substantially in coverage and sources that the apparent decline in price rigidity may be simply the result of different studies using different goods.
This leads to the central question of this paper: Has price rigidity declined over time?
Specifically, from the today's perspective does 1889, Professor Patten's age of rapidly fluctuating prices, look like the "good old times" of highly rigid prices? To answer this question, goods from 1889-1891 are compared with similar goods from 1997-1999. For each of these two periods, broadly similar data sets are constructed covering retail price microdata over 28-months in 4 cities and up to 48 different product groups, including foods, household goods and clothing.
Over forty thousand first-differenced observations are available in each of the two periods. As compared to [1997] [1998] [1999] , the data for 1889-1891 show:
(1) A lower frequency of retail price changes 
Prior Microdata Studies and Wholesale vs. Retail prices
Numerous prior studies, dating back at least to Mills (1927) , have examined the frequency and size of price changes. A summary of results from some of these earlier studies is presented in Table 1 . The estimated time between price changes varies widely, ranging from just over two weeks to nearly three-quarters of a century, while the absolute size of price changes extends from less than one percent to nearly thirty percent.
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The huge differences in products across the studies in table 1 make drawing conclusions about changes in the frequency or size of prices changes across time problematic. However, as noted previously, there appears to be less nominal price rigidity in the more recent studies of Bils and Klenow, and Levy, et al. than in the earlier studies of Cecchetti, Kashyap and Carlton.
2 Bils and Klenow (2004) , Levy, et al (1997) . 3 In all studies, observations where the price is unchanged are dropped from the calculation of the size of price changes.
Unlike the other studies listed in table 1, Bezanson, et al. (1936) and Mills (1927) examine prices in more than a single time period, and these studies both also generally show a downward drift in the frequency of price changes within the periods they cover. However, both studies used wholesale rather than retail prices.
Wholesale prices suffer from three problems when attempting to ascertain the length of nominal price rigidity. First, collected list prices might not reflect actual transaction prices because wholesale products are often negotiated on a customer-by-customer basis. 4 Second, the effective good received by the purchaser might change over time as varying delivery lags and other non-price means of allocation are common with wholesale goods. 5 These two problems can result in a constant price being observed when a price change should be recorded, which will lead to an upward bias in the measurement of the length of nominal rigidity.
A third problem with wholesale prices is that wholesale prices are not unique. A single unit may be sold many times before retail. For example, during the earlier period in this paper at least three prices before retail were common: the price received by producers (or farmers); the price received by large wholesalers; and the price received by jobbers, the small scale wholesalers who bought from the large wholesalers and sold directly to the retail stores. Each of these prices may have different characteristics. 6 The inclusion of large wholesale auction market prices, which are likely to exhibit little nominal rigidity, along with jobber prices may be the reason that price changes appear to occur much more frequently in the studies of Mills and Bezanson, et al. Retail prices avoid most difficulties of wholesale prices. In retail markets price negotiation seldom occurs, customers usually receive their goods immediately, and a single unit of a product is sold at retail only once. These differences make retail prices preferable to wholesale prices in determining price rigidity.
Retail prices, however, do have some problems. Temporary stock-outs can lead to missing observations. Also, minor product specification changes may lead to the changed good being classified as a new item, and can thereby hide a price change. 7 Further, retail prices tend to be heterogeneous with respect to brand and packaging sizes. The different brands and 4 Stigler and Kindahl (1973) . 5 Carlton (1983 5 Carlton ( , 1986 , Morgenstern (1931 ), Dimand (2000 , and Backman (1940 p. 485) . Koelln and Rush (1993) in their critique of Cecchetti (1986) note a similar concept can apply to retail goods, for example when the number of pages in a magazine is reduced. 6 Backman (1940 p. 487 ) discusses market structure and price rigidity. 7 An example of this type of a minor product change occurred in 2001 when Kleenex reduced the number of tissues in a box from a 250 to a 230 but kept the same price. (Consumer Reports (2001) ) Tissues are not included in any of the product groupings, and it is not known if minor specification changes hid price changes in any of the actual goods sampled.
package sizes may have different characteristics with respect to nominal price rigidity, and the heterogeneity may itself lead to greater price rigidity as firms may have more market power.
The extent of these problems among the product sampled here is unknown, but minor product specification changes and product heterogeneity-which lead to longer estimates of nominal price rigidity-are probably more common in the 1997-1999 data sample, suggesting that adjusting for them would strengthen the results found later in the paper.
An Overview of the Time Periods and Data
This study focuses on pricing across time, and therefore it is necessary to control for factors that are not necessarily related to long-run changes across time but might cause different pricing patterns between the two samples. Chief among these are different macroeconomic conditions and data sampling methods in the two periods. The choice of data has minimized these two potential problems. The macroeconomic conditions in 1889-1891 and 1997-1999, while not identical, are similar enough that they are unlikely to cause major differences in the microdata. For example, neither period includes a wartime economy, a sustained recession, or a severe crash in the financial markets. (See table 2 .) Nor were price controls or price supports important during these periods. Also, both periods have similar inflation rates that are among the lowest inflation episodes in the past one hundred and fifty years. 8 The similarity in inflation rates is extremely important when comparing the frequency of price changes across time because aggregate inflation is one of the main causes of price changes. In a literature review Taylor (1999) states:
The frequency of wage and price changes depends on the average rate of inflation...
[P]rices at small businesses, industrial prices, and even the prices of products like magazines are adjusted more quickly when the rate of inflation is higher. This dependency of price and wage setting on events in the economy is one of the more robust empirical findings in the studies reviewed here. (p. 1021)
Further, the retail price microdata are surprisingly consistent on methodological grounds. Both data sets are actual price quotes of retail establishments sampled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics at a given point in each month. In both sets the prices quoted should closely reflect transaction prices. 8 Reliable estimates of aggregate consumer price inflation are not available for the 1889-1891 period, therefore table 2 shows wholesale price inflation. 9 There are a few relatively minor differences in methodology which are not expected to cause a problem, such as collecting the prices every month, which is the current practice, versus collecting the prices for the entire 28-month period from the merchant's transaction records at the end of the period, which was the The 1997-1999 dataset was specifically constructed to conform as closely as possible to the available data from the 1889-1891 period. Starting and ending dates were chosen to match the length and seasonality of the earlier data. Both datasets start in June and end in September 27 months later. Products were chosen to maximize the number of comparable product groups common to both samples. Localities were chosen to maximize the number of localities with monthly price quotes in both samples.
Twenty-seven food products, seven clothing products, and fourteen household and hardware products, for a total of forty-eight products, are common to both the Aldrich report and current BLS CPI sample. Table 3 lists these 48 products. There also are four geographic locations surveyed monthly in both samples: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Newark.
Even within relatively disaggregated locations and products, substantial differences among the sampled items is present within a group. For example, stores in high and low rent areas might exist within a single location group, while only broadly related products might exist within a single product group. 11 Also, various sizes and brands of the same product might exist within a single product group.
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For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that all goods within a given product or location group have similar price adjustment characteristics.
Basic statistics for the two datasets, shown in shown in the three panels of figure 1.
In 43 of the 48 product groups the frequency of price changes was lower in 1889-1891 than in 1997-1999. These product groups are shown in the top panel of figure 1 .
The lower frequency of price changes in 1889-1891 is much more pronounced for nonfood goods than for the food goods-a result of the extreme rigidity displayed by non-food goods gives the probability of a price remaining unchanged for a given length of time. 17 In 1889-1891 the probability that a spell of nominal rigidity would extend at least 28 months was greater than 50 percent. By comparison, the likelihood that spell of nominal rigidity would last at least 28 months in 1997-1999 was less than 20 percent. Moreover, for every length of time, the share of price quotes remaining unchanged is higher in 1889-1891 than in 1997-1999 and the 95 percent confidence intervals (not shown) do not overlap.
The various methods of cutting the data all suggest that price changes were much more frequent in 1997-1999 than in 1889-1891. From today's perspective, Professor Patten's age of rapidly fluctuating prices looks like the "good old times" of nominal price rigidity.
Before tackling a few possible explanations for the change in nominal rigidity, it will be useful to point out some other differences between the 1889-1891 and 1997-1999 data.
A smaller average magnitude of price changes The three panels of figure 3 differentiate observations by product, by location, and by month. The top panel shows that three-quarters of the products had a smaller magnitude of price changes in the earlier period, though the size of price changes varies widely by product.
The bottom two panels of figure 3 show that for each location and every month the magnitude of price changes was smaller in 1889-1891 than in 1997-1999.
In both periods products that changed price more often were more likely to have slightly larger price changes. The relationship between the frequency and size of price changes is plotted in figures 4 and 5 using observations grouped by location and product. The positive relationship between the frequency and size of price changes is more robust in 1997-1999 than it is in 1889-1891. In the earlier data, the positive correlation is almost entirely driven by the price of tomatoes.
As with the frequency of price changes, the change in the magnitude of price changes is consistent across different ways of looking at the data. In each method of slicing the data, the magnitude of price changes was somewhat lower in 1889-1891 than in 1997-1999.
Fewer very small price changes
Even though the average magnitude of prices changes may have been lower in 1889-1891 than in 1997-1999 there appears to have been fewer very small price changes in 1889-1891.
Pooling all price changes together, the cumulative distribution of the size of price changes is shown in figure 6 . A noticeable trait of the 1889-1891 data is the fairly sharp change in the slope of the cumulative distribution as the size of the change approaches zero. The flatness suggests price changes that are a small amount of the good's price are avoided. 19 This behavior is predicted by a cost to changing prices, such as a menu cost. In 1997-1999 there is little observable flatness around zero, suggesting price changes less than a couple percent in size were no less likely to occur than price changes a few percentage points larger.
18 Changing the threshold from three or more observations substantially changes the number of possible cell comparisons, but has little effect on the share of cells for which the magnitude of price changes increased. 19 It should be emphasized that "small" is defined in terms of the percentage change in the good's price. As noted earlier, the size of price changes in dollar terms has increased as a result of the around 6,000 percent increase in overall prices that occurred over the 118 years between the two time periods.
The paucity of small price changes in 1889-1891 is even more apparent in figure 7. This figure displays the share of price changes (vertical axis) less than a given absolute size (the horizontal axis). In 1889-1891 the share of price changes that were less than 2.5 percent in magnitude was less than a fifth the share in 1997-1999. Also, almost no price changes in the earlier period were less than 1.5 percent in magnitude. Such small price changes were not uncommon in the 1997-1999 period.
Monetary indivisibility is an alternative to a price changing cost for explaining the lack of small price changes in 1889-1891. Despite the large change in the price level since 1889, the smallest coin minted in the US in 1889 had the same nominal value as the smallest coin currently minted-1-cent. This likely discouraged some merchants from making price changes less than 1-cent in magnitude. However, in the 1889-1891 data, 2-cent and 5-cent price changes were each slightly more common than 1-cent price changes, which would not be expected if monetary indivisibility were significant problem. 20 Further, with some of the goods in the earlier period being sold in bulk, price changes less than 1-cent in size were not uncommon, about 7 percent of price changes in 1889-1891 were less than 1-cent in magnitude.
Less use of Temporary Price Reductions (Sales) and More Price Churning Lal and Matutes (1994) cite a survey of supermarket managers suggesting temporary price reductions became more important during the 1980s. How important are temporary price reductions in explaining the higher frequency of price changes observed in 1997-1999?
Only one-and two-month temporary price reductions are considered in this paper. A one-month temporary price reduction is defined as a drop in price perfectly counteracted the following month.
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A two-month temporary price reduction is a drop in price taken back in either one of the next two months.
It is possible that this definition of a temporary price reduction does not catch all shortterm sales of goods. For example, the definition would miss a good put on sale at a lower price before moving to a new, higher-than-before "regular" price. But, using higher frequency data, Warner and Barsky (1995) find 51 out 62 temporary price reductions in their sample were 20 In the 1889-1891 data, price changes that had a nominal value of 2-cents accounted for 20 percent of the price changes, followed by 5-cents (19 percent of price changes), 1-cent (17 percent), 3-cents (10 percent), 1/2-cent (5 percent), and 10-cents (5 percent). 21 The price in month two is less than in month one, but in month three it returns to the price in month one. Observations where a reduction in price occurred in the last sampled month are dropped since it is impossible to determine if the price change was a temporary price reduction or a more permanent price reduction. Hosken, Matsa, and Reiffen (2000) use a similar definition.
exactly reversed, suggesting that this definition of temporary price reductions probably catches most sales.
Similar to temporary price reductions are price markdowns. Price markdowns start with a high initial price that is gradually reduced over time. Markdowns differ from temporary price reductions in that the price never increases until the product is sold out. They are common in goods for which fads or fashions change quickly and production runs are short.
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Few of the product groups in the sample fit this description and therefore significant effects from price markdowns are unlikely. Nonetheless, even excluding temporary price reductions and price markdowns, price changes were at least four times more common in 1997-1999 than in 1889-1891.
Excluding price markdowns and temporary price reductions has less effect on the magnitude of price changes. Removing temporary price reductions decreases the magnitude of price changes about 2 to 3 percent in 1997-1999, suggesting that temporary price reductions during that period were somewhat larger in magnitude than normal price changes. In contrast, removing temporary price reductions has a negligible effect on the average magnitude of price changes in 1889-1891.
An alternative view of temporary price changes can be seen by looking at the probability of two consecutive price changes of the same sign. In a standard S-s pricing model with permanent shocks to the optimal price, and no trend drift rate in the optimal price, the probability of the next price change being in the same direction as the previous price change is 50 percent. If there is a trend drift rate in the optimal price, this probability will be higher than 50 percent, whereas if changes in the optimal price are temporary the probability may be below 50 percent. In the 1889-1891 period, the next price change was somewhat more likely to be in the same direction as the previous price change, while consecutive price changes were less likely to be in the same direction in 1997-1999. (Table 6 .) This finding suggests that price changes were more permanent in 1889-1891 than they were in 1997-1999.
Discussion
To understand the potential causes of the differences in price adjustment in 1889-1891 and 1997-1999 , it is useful to summarize some of the major changes that have taken place in the retailing environment during the last century.
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First, stores today are much larger than they were in the late 1880s, both in the number of employees and in the number of goods offered for sale. In 1889-1891 most stores were quite small and concentrated on a few products. For example, in 1889 the grocery chain A&P sold mostly tea, coffee, butter, sugar and baking powder. 24 By 1928, the number of items carried by the average grocery store increased to 867. This jumped to around 3,000 items in each store in 1946 and to 6,800 in 1963. 25 Today, conventional supermarkets carry around 25,000 items and include a bakery, a meat counter, and a large selection of non-food items. 26 Measuring store size
by the number of employees shows a similar increase. Quantitative information for 1890 is scare, but Nystrom (1919 Nystrom ( , 1930 suggests that stores were usually a one or two man operation. Kroger, a grocery chain based in Cincinnati, operated only seven stores in 1890. 29 Barger (1955) estimates that chain stores held a miniscule fraction of grocery business in the U.S. before 22 Pashigian (1988) 23 This section concentrates on the food retailing industry, since most of the products used in this study are sold in supermarkets, but the broad outline should be applicable to changes throughout the retail goods industry. 24 Bullock (1933) concerns. For instance, the retailer often supplied credit to the customer, and the inability to collect on this credit was the downfall of many grocery stores. Because transportation was difficult and carrying purchases was burdensome, retailers usually delivered the purchases to the customer's home at no extra charge. This gave customers a reason to stay loyal to the retailer.
Regular customers might be placed near the beginning of a delivery route, getting the butter when it was still hard, while customers with less of a relationship might not get their goods until the end of the delivery route, when the butter was getting soft. The importance of the retail relationship in the late-1800s was noted by the editor of the American Grocer in 1896:
The grocery business is, perhaps more than any other, dependent for success or failure upon the individuality of the man engaged in it, even more than his business methods. If he wins the confidence of customers by keeping only good things, selling them at reasonable prices, being obliging and prompt in his deliveries and is reasonably careful about given credits, he will command and hold patronage.
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The few surveys available document declining customer loyalty to a particular store over the last century. 1994. In almost all years, the main reason for switching stores was lower prices at the new store.
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A final difference in the retail environment is that the share of income spent on the goods covered in this study has declined substantially. Although food goods make up most of the observations in this study, the share of food in consumer expenditures has dropped from 40 percent in 1889-1891 to approximately 10 percent in 1997-1999.
These four changes in retailing structure (larger stores, greater industry concentration, declining customer-retailer relationship, and declining importance of food) have probably reduced the cost to changing prices. Larger stores, by carrying more products and employees, can exploit economies of scale in changing prices. Empirically, Buckle and Carlson (2000) find larger firms change prices more often. Similarly, the increase in industry concentration may also have lowered the cost of changing prices because many chain store pricing decisions are made above the store level. This allows the managerial costs of deciding when and by how much to change prices to be spread across many stores. Ball and Mankiw (1994) suggest that managerial costs are much larger than menu costs, a point echoed in the empirical work of Zbaracki, et al. If the cost of changing prices was higher in 1889-1891 than in 1997-1999 most standard models of price adjustment would find the less frequent price changes and fewer "small" price changes that were observed in the data. But, standard pricing models with permanent shocks would not predict the smaller average magnitude of price changes observed in 1889-1891, or the use of temporary price reductions that have become more prevalent in the recent period.
We can reconcile these last two findings if we assume that a significant share of the shocks to the profit maximizing price are temporary. Take a simple time-dependent pricing example: Assume the optimal price follows a moving average of independent standard normal shocks,
. By definition, the firm would charge the optimal price in a perfectly frictionless world. However, say that the firm must pay a cost, C , to see the realized value of the shocks and the resulting optimal price. In practice, this cost could come about because the firm must expend labor to interpret the effect of changes in supply costs or customer buying 34 Burgoyne (1980 ), Food Marketing Institute (1994 . These are the only surveys I have found asking this question. In one year, 1990, the top reason for switching grocery stores was that the new store was closer or had a more convenient location, possibly the result of a move by the respondent.
habits on the price the firm should charge. In other words, the cost, C, is an administrative cost of determining the best price to charge, and not a true menu cost. After paying the price determination cost, there is no additional cost to changing prices. Once the firm pays the cost C, they observe the shock to the optimal price and then set the price for the current period, p t .
They continue to charge the price p t until the next time the firm pays the cost to observe the optimal price. Finally, the per period loss from maintaining a price that deviates from the optimal price is the square of the deviation, Assume that the firm initially chooses to observe the optimal price every third period, and changes their price every time the optimal price is observed. The frequency of price changes is then 1/3. To minimize the per period loss, the firm will set the actual price to the average expected optimal price. With the firm changing price every third period, this is:
where the last equality occurs because shocks are mean-zero in expectation. Given this actual price, the expected magnitude of price changes (measured here by the expected squared size of price changes) is: Next, assume the firm changes price every other period. The frequency of price changes then increases to 1/2. The firm will set its actual price to the average expected optimal price in the next two periods: < . This suggests that, for a given size of temporary shocks, a lower cost of price changes will increase the frequency of price changes, a result that occurs in nearly all price setting models. However, the expected size of price changes when the changing price every other period is
, which is larger than the size of price changes when setting price every third period. When price changes become more frequent, price changes become larger because firms now follow the up and down patterns that occur with temporary shocks rather than smoothing through the short-run volatility. The transitory shocks will also lead to the more temporary nature of price changes seen in the 1997-1999 data. Figure 9 shows how the size of price changes relates to the persistence of shocks in a version of this time-dependent example where shocks occur continuously and time between price changes is also allowed to vary continuously. When shocks to the optimal price are permanent, reducing the time between price changes always leads to a decrease in the magnitude of price changes. On the other hand, when shocks to the optimal price are temporary, reducing the time between price changes leads to an increase in the magnitude of price changes if the initial time between price changes is relatively long. The intuition behind this result is that when shocks are temporary, and the length of time between price changes is long, little attention is paid to the current shocks in setting the price because the shocks will be long gone by the time of the next price change.
One additional feature of this simple model is that magnitude of price changes can be larger when shocks are temporary than when shocks are permanent. Consider the discrete-time example, but now with permanent shocks. In this case, when changing their price the firm will set it equal to the current optimal price. When changing price every other period this implies that the expected size of price changes is:
which is smaller than the 2 1 2 2 µ σ size of price changes that occurred when shocks were temporary and firms changed price every other period.
That temporary shocks can sometimes lead to larger price changes than permanent shocks is also visible in figure 9. If shock persistence is long relative to the time between price changes, then temporary shocks will lead to larger price changes than will permanent shocks.
Larger price changes in response to temporary shocks is also consistent to what was found in the data on table 5. There the size of price changes decreased when temporary price reductions were filtered out of the 1997-1999 data.
Intuitively, temporary shocks can lead to larger price changes than permanent shocks because temporary shocks create a more variable change in the optimal price over short-horizon.
When shocks are temporary, at any given instance a new shock occurs and an old shock disappears, each of which adds variance to the change in the optimal price. When shocks are permanent old shocks never disappear, and only new shocks perturb the optimal price making short-term changes in the optimal price less variable.
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Before concluding, it should be emphasized that the results presented in this paper refer to microdata prices not to aggregate prices. Changes in the cross-correlation of prices or changes in the composition of output may make aggregate rigidity results different from those found in this paper. For example, Hanes (1998 Hanes ( , 1999 suggests that the economy has become more processed over the last one hundred years. He also suggests (as do Bils and Klenow (2004) and Thompson and Wilson (1999) ) that processed goods are more rigid than unprocessed goods.
Conclusion
That nominal price rigidity may have declined over time is suggested when comparing the handful of previous studies and anecdotal evidence. On the other hand, this apparent decline of nominal price rigidity could have been an artifact of inconsistencies in coverage and sources across the different studies. The results presented here suggest this probably is not the case, and nominal price rigidity likely has declined. Using consistent data in two periods widely separated in time, this paper found nominal price rigidity in 1997-1999 was substantially less than in 1889-1891. The decline in nominal price rigidity is robust across the goods, months, and locations matched across the two periods. Further, the decline does not appear to be the result of differences in aggregate inflation rates.
Additional findings include an increase in the average magnitude of price changes between 1889-1891 and 1997-1999 , though the difference between the two periods is less dramatic than is the difference in nominal price rigidity. Finally, small price changes and temporary price reductions have become more common in the recent period.
These findings are consistent with a model in which shocks to the optimal price are transitory and in which the cost of changing prices decreased between 1889-1891 and 1997-1999. The cost of changing prices likely fell between the two periods as a result of changes in the retailing environment, which included larger stores, greater industry concentration, the declining customer-retailer relationship, and the declining importance of food.
35 If the optimal price followed a mean-reverting autoregressive process, rather than a moving average process, then the expected size of price changes would converge to the permanent shock case as shocks became more persistent. This does not occur with the moving average shock example shown. Further, an analytically-intractable S-s model with temporary shocks is also likely to find that price changes in response to temporary shocks are larger than price changes in response to permanent shocks. This is because the additional profit (prior to deducting the cost of the price change) from a temporary price In sum, from today's perspective, Professor Patten's age of highly variable prices looks like the good old times of nominal price rigidity.
change would have to pay the menu cost twice (once for the price increase and once the price decrease) whereas the additional profit from a permanent price change would only have to pay the menu cost once. -1890-1897 1898-1905 1906-1913 1914-1921 1922-1925 Wholesale Commodity Prices Mills (1927) 4.5 to 15 weeks -1991-1992 Prices in Supermarket chains Levy, et al. (1997 Levy, et al. ( ) 2.3 weeks 24% 1986 Levy, et al. ( -1992 Lettuce in grocery stores Powers and Powers (2001) 36 Median length 37 Approximated from Bezanson, et al. (1936) chart VI p. 55. 38 Inverse of median commodity frequency of price change from appendix table VIII. S a l t a n d s e a s o n i n g s R i c e M u t t o n C a n n e d v e g e t a b l e s T e a C o f f e e C a n n e d 1963, 1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1985 . US Bureau of the Census, Economic Census 1987 , 1992 , 1997 . 1953, 1964, 1978, 1987 , and 1998 the current consumer price index evolved. Even with large changes in the product mix of the consumer's basket over the last one hundred and ten years, and enormous shifts in population distribution, some of the goods and cities sampled in the Aldrich Report overlap with the sampling for today's Consumer
Price Index. 42 It should be noted that there has been some innovative work in reconstructing time series of prices (for examplem magazine cover prices (Cecchetti, 1986) and catalog prices (Kashyap, 1995) ). While a potentially longer time span of prices may be obtained this way, these sources are much more constrained in the frequency of quotes, the number of goods covered. Further, the data can not be used to compare differences across cities. 43 BLS Bulletin No. 699.
A series of interactions between the author and BLS personnel led to the formation a list of goods and cities roughly comparable with the two different groups of data. This concordance is given as Appendix Tables A1 and A2 . After compilation of the data specifications, and a required petition to the Commissioner of the BLS, the BLS provided screened 1997-1999 microdata for comparison with the Aldrich Report data.
In tailoring the 1997-1999 data to conform as closely as possible to the available data from 1889-1891, beginning and ending dates were chosen to exactly match the length and seasonality of the earlier data. Both sets of data begin in June and end 27 months later in September. Products were chosen to maximize the number of comparable product groups common to both samples. Localities were chosen to maximize the number of localities with monthly sampling in both periods.
As I use microdata rather than a price index, the various CPI formula changes over the years are not relevant and will not affect the results. The data in both periods were sampled by trained BLS personnel bringing, hopefully, some degree of professionalism and uniformity to the Tables A1 and A2 . Given the increasing mobility of the population it is assumed the broader groupings do not substantially alter the results. 
